The import is that different components of power of a foreign state are more or less threatening and aggregate shifts in power alone may not provoke counterbalancing behavior. Instead, leaders define threats based on particular elements of a foreign state's power. In contrast to balance of power and balance of threat theories, states do not balance against aggregate or net shifts in power.
This article challenges the conventional wisdom that Neville Chamberlain rejected the British tradition of balance of power in the 1930s. The second is to demonstrate that in a restrictive international milieu, strong leadership, a factor underappreciated by neoclassical realists, is essential even for single-party governments, which are normally expected to have greater autonomy in democratic parliamentary systems, to formulate foreign policy. The first is to prove that in restrictive international environments where opportunities and threats are clear and the decision-making process is constrained by time, domestic divisions may matter in foreign policy and prevail over the systemic imperative, contrary to conventional expectations. In this framework, the study has two primary purposes. While the domestic political environment was favorable for the Turkish government to reach such a decision, it was hindered by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT). Systemic and structural factors made cooperation with the United States an imperative for Turkey, which may be classified as a secondary state in the regional context. The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government initially sought a peaceful settlement but eventually decided to align with the United States. The United States requested Turkey’s collaboration in the war against Iraq. This study deals with Turkey’s Iraq War Decision that led up to the March 1 Parliamentary Motion Crisis in 2003 from the perspective of neoclassical realism, which analyzes the interaction between systemic and unit-level variables. It suggests that-while such implications should not be overstated-plausible outcomes could include the fragmentation of the UK and its collective defence effort, diminished political and fiscal capacity for national security policymaking, and a less benign regional security environment, including the possibility of a federal ‘United States of Europe’ eventually dictating terms to Britain. The article then progresses to consider the potential UK national security implications as the Brexit process unfolds. Building on Tim Oliver’s recent article in International Politics (2016), this essay contends that the most suitable targets for future research into the causes of the Brexit vote include the economic and cultural distortions of globalisation and the factor flows associated with it, public and corporate policy failures over more than three decades, a strong public attachment to representative democracy, and distinctive conceptions of Britain’s role in the world. These processes served to bring about the ‘Leave’ vote in the referendum of 23 June 2016 and will continue to shape subsequent outcomes: both the Brexit settlement that is eventually negotiated, and Britons’ satisfaction (or otherwise) with such a deal.
BATTLE FLEET NEOCLASSICAL SERIES
‘Brexit’-Britain’s forthcoming exit from the European Union-can be understood as a series of related material and ideational processes. alleged paradox of the campaign's personal dynamics was that it saw Jeremy Corbyn (Labour) pretending to be pro-EU in order to retain control of his party (O'Neill 2016a), making for a lacklustre Remain campaign on the left, while Johnson (Conservative) pretended to be anti-EU in the hope of winning control of his (Demianyk 2016). 14 The significance of key individuals in causing a political shock of international-systemic importance further demonstrates the value of the recent renewed wave of scholarly attention to the importance of leaders in explaining major foreign policy outcomes (for example : Roth 2010 Saunders 2011 Yarhi-Milo 2014 Horowitz et al. The remarkable thing is not that wealthy, capital-holding voters (of all colours and genders) backed a Republican candidate, but that a sufficient share of the capital-lacking lower-middle and working classes (whites overwhelmingly among them) backed that same candidate-while others from the same economic classes failed to turn out to vote for a widely reviled alternative candidate, Hillary Clinton-to give him a winning electoral coalition.
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